Abstract
Introduction
As the now classic adage goes, -on the Internet, no one knows you are a dog‖. Given the issues resulting from significant information asymmetry in online transactions, it has become more important than ever for online markets to adopt mechanisms that help establish and maintain credibility and trust among participants. The most popular and well-studied among these is the reputation mechanism (or feedback mechanism) which helps communicate product/seller quality and promote trust among buyers and sellers by allowing them to share their opinions and experiences with other members (Dellarocas 2003) .
Numerous online markets, such as eLance.com, Rentacoder.com, Amazon.com, and eBay have adopted reputation mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry. Among them, eBay's reputation mechanism is arguably the most established and the most scrutinized by the popular press and academics. On eBay, a buyer can leave positive, neutral, or negative ratings to a seller after a transaction. Based on these feedbacks, the seller's reputation is calculated and metrics such as the total number of feedbacks and the percentage of positive ratings are made available to other potential buyers.
Although it has been argued that the reputation mechanism works well for eBay, it is not without drawbacks. One particular problem is the potential for -gaming‖ the system. Typically, both buyers and sellers on eBay can provide feedback regarding the other party in the transaction and this feedback is available for others in the marketplace. However, it has been suggested that, due to the threat of retaliation from sellers, buyers who had a bad experience might prefer to remain silent instead of leaving negative ratings (Dellarocas and Wood 2008) . The ability of buyers and/or sellers to -game‖ the reputation mechanism threatens to reduce its effectiveness and exacerbate informational asymmetry.
Despite an increasing awareness of the potential adverse impacts of users' strategic gaming behavior of online reputation mechanisms, there are still significant gaps in our understanding of how users react to reputation mechanisms and how reputation mechanisms could be appropriately designed (Masclet and Penard 2008) . In this paper, we investigate a crucial aspect of the reputation mechanism design -the ability of buyers and sellers to -revoke‖ or -mutually withdraw‖ their feedbacks.
Specifically, we seek to understand how sellers behave in a two-way reputation mechanism that allows revoking and how their behaviors are impacted by the change to a one-way reputation mechanism.
A feedback (usually a negative one) can be revoked if both the seller and the buyer mutually agree to do so. Such revoking may happen if a seller -corrects‖ his mistake by either replacing a previous low quality product with a better one, or refunds the buyer. Although the original intention of this policy was to allow correction of honest mistakes to recover reputation, it has the potential to be abused by bad sellers. Specifically, upon receiving a negative feedback from a buyer, the seller could retaliate with a negative feedback as well, and then suggest withdrawing both negative feedbacks.
For an inherently -good seller‖, revoking a negative feedback could be the result of correcting an honest mistake. For an inherently -bad seller‖, revoking could be the result of nefarious tactics that force the buyer to withdraw her negative feedback in exchange for the seller withdrawing his negative feedback of the buyer. In either of these situations, the character of the seller is a given -the seller is either good or bad -a standard assumption of models of adverse selection. A third possibility involves a moral hazard setting: a seller who would otherwise behave honestly by correcting his mistakes may choose not to when the chance of opportunistic retaliation and revoking exists -the case of the -ugly seller‖. In this study, we are able to empirically test which of the above assumptions -the assumption underlying adverse selection models or the assumption underlying moral hazard models of seller behavior -drives revoking of feedback in eBay auctions. Further, we are interested in understanding how users react to the changes in reputation mechanisms, and the resulting implications for the design of online reputation mechanisms.
Our study is among the first to examine the implications of feedback-revoking behavior in online markets.
While it has been difficult to examine if seller behavior is driven by seller type (the adverse selection assumption) or by seller effort (the moral hazard assumption), recent changes in eBay's reputation mechanism provide us a unique opportunity to examine this issue. On January 30 th , 2008, eBay announced a radical overhaul of its reputation mechanism for the first time in its history. Among other changes, negative feedbacks are no longer allowed to be withdrawn. More importantly, starting in 4 May of 2008, sellers are no longer allowed to leave negative feedbacks for buyers -in essence, this eliminates the possibility of strategic revoking behavior by sellers. Not surprisingly, this caused outrage amongst sellers and culminated in a week-long strike (from February 18 th to February 25 th ) protesting these changes (Zouhali-Worrall 2008) . The changes in eBay's reputation mechanism allow us to examine the impact of changes in reputation mechanism design on seller behaviors as well as transactional outcomes and market efficiency. Although there have been numerous studies showing that reputation matters to sales in eBay auctions (Dewan and Hsu 2004, Lucking-Reily et al. 2007 ), we provide the first empirical evidence on sellers' reactions to the changes in reputation mechanism design.
We find evidence that sellers do indeed respond to the design of the reputation mechanism. In the two-way reputation mechanism (prior to the recent changes), certain sellers exhibited opportunistic behavior by revoking the negative feedbacks they received, thus making the reputation mechanism less effective in discerning the quality of sellers. Further, we find that these sellers were also more likely to participate in the strike to protest the changes. The changes in the reputation mechanism design have a significant influence on the behavior of these sellers. Most interestingly, we find that, after the changes (in particular, the ban on revoking of feedbacks), sellers who were likely to revoke feedbacks earlier significantly improved the quality of their transactions as evidenced by the changes to their reputation scores.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of eBay's reputation mechanism, including the recent change. Data are described in section 3. Section 4 examines whether revoking hurts the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism. In sections 5 and 6, we analyze the response of sellers to the reputation mechanism change both upon the announcement and two months after implementation. Section 7 describes the additional robustness checks and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Overview of eBay's Reputation Mechanism
eBay was launched in 1995 and has become the dominant online marketplace in the U.S. Since online markets are vulnerable to substantial information asymmetry for buyers and sellers a large part of eBay's success is attributable to its effort to build a trustworthy transaction environment. Several factors exacerbate the trust issues in a marketplace like eBay. First, participation is easy. Registration requires only a valid email address. Second, there is very little information available about the members of eBay.
Members may use a pseudonym as their ID and eBay does not reveal the user's real name or address.
Third, the eBay marketplace is truly global and there is no obvious way to refer to institutional or legal systems to resolve disputes in transactions. Although a seller's account could be closed by eBay if significant dishonest behavior is discovered, it is relatively easy for the seller to create a new user ID and renew his participation in eBay.
The primary source of information about the trustworthiness of a seller is his feedback profile.
Upon the completion of a transaction, both buyers and sellers have the opportunity to leave a feedback within 90 days. The feedback has three levels of valence: positive, neutral, and negative. In addition, buyers and sellers can provide detailed comments about each other regarding the transaction. Once a feedback is given, it cannot be removed unilaterally; both the seller and buyer must agree to mutually withdraw their feedbacks.
On the face of it, the eBay reputation mechanism seems to have been working well. Although economic theories predict that feedbacks, as a public good, should be under-provided, about 50% of the buyers on eBay do leave feedbacks (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) . Further, over 99% of the feedbacks left on eBay are positive. This seems to suggest that the degree of satisfaction is very high on eBay (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) .
However, there is evidence of inefficiency in eBay's reputation mechanism. Some sellers continue to peddle fraudulent items with misleading descriptions without being caught. For instance, it is estimated that over 70% of the Tiffany jewels sold on eBay are fakes (Hafner 2007) . There is, then, good 6 reason to be suspicions of eBay's 99% positive feedbacks. Further, one would expect an effective reputation mechanism to reward good sellers. However researchers have failed to find consistent evidence for the impact of a seller's reputation on auction price. Resnick et al. (2006) , for example, find that negative feedbacks seemed to have no impact on buyers' willingness-to-pay. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) examined sales of laptops, coins, and beanie babies on eBay and find that neither positive nor negative feedbacks influence the final auction price. Melnik and Alm (2002) find that even when a seller doubles his ratings, the consumer's willingness-to-pay for gold coin increases only by 18 cents. Similarly, Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) find that positive ratings have a negligible impact on price. This is echoed by Eaton (2005) who finds that a seller's reputation has little or no impact on the actual bid prices.
A close examination of eBay's feedback mechanism reveals two major problems. The first problem is retaliation. On eBay, both buyers and sellers care about their reputations. Sellers expect buyers to consider their reputations when bidding, rewarding sellers who have better reputations with higher bids. Buyers with good reputations may also expect sellers to favor them over competitor buyers with poorer reputations. In addition, the need for social recognition may incentivize both buyers and sellers to achieve better reputations (Gross and Acquisti 2003) . On eBay, sellers and buyers may independently leave feedbacks within 90 days of the transaction and the feedback is available immediately to the other party. This creates an incentive for one party to strategically hold back its feedback as a way of retaliation if the other party provides a negative feedback. Effectively, buyers are able to encourage sellers to behave honestly by holding seller reputation and future sales hostage (Ba et al. 2003; Yamagishi and Matsuda 2002) . For their part, sellers are able to hold buyer reputation hostage so that buyers do not leave them negative feedbacks. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) find that half of the time sellers withheld their feedback to buyers, even if the seller received payment from the buyer before the buyer received the items. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) find that if a buyer leaves a negative feedback about a seller, she has a 40% chance of getting a negative feedback from that seller. Consequently, due to fear of retaliation, buyers with bad transaction experience are reluctant to leave negative feedbacks to the sellers (Dellarocas and Wood 2008) . The results of other studies further support the presence of such reporting bias (Klein et al. 2006; Reichling 2004) . The biased reporting of feedback by parties to a transaction has been shown to be a major reason for the overwhelmingly positive feedbacks on eBay -customers with a negative experience simply choose not to leave negative feedback for the seller.
The second problem with eBay's feedback mechanism -the one that is the focus of our study -is revoking. eBay's revoking policy states that the two parties of a transaction are allowed to withdraw their feedbacks when there is mutual agreement to do so. Researchers have argued that a forum for apology (provided, in eBay, by the revoking policy) is important in reputation mechanism design because it helps repair trust breakdown (Vasalou et al. 2008) . The intention of this policy is to facilitate the reconciliation of any dispute in a transaction and to correct errors in ratings, but, in practice, revoking creates a way for sellers to manipulate their reputation. This option allows a seller who receives a negative feedback to strategically reply with a negative feedback in order to induce mutual agreement for withdrawal (Bolton et al 2007; Klein et al. 2009 ). In the vast majority of cases, revoking (a withdrawal of feedbacks based on mutual agreement) is preceded by mutual negative feedbacks. When a seller responds to a negative feedback with a negative feedback, about 27% are later withdrawn through the revoking mechanism (Bolton et al. 2009 ). To the extent that revoking helps convert negative ratings to nullified ratings, it can help bad sellers disguise their dark pasts and send misleading signals to other buyers in the marketplace.
Negative ratings are very rare (typically less than 1% of total ratings) and carry significantly more weight than positive ratings (Standifird 2001; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002) . By revoking negative ratings, a bad seller can effectively manage his reputation, making him appear as good as, or even better, than truly good sellers.
Retaliation and revoking has made eBay's reputation mechanism less effective in signaling the quality of sellers. Scholars have suggested different ways to enhance the system. In a theoretical analysis followed by experiments, Masclet and Pé nard (2008) suggested that the eBay feedback mechanism could be improved by either constraining partners to leave ratings simultaneously or by predetermining the 8 rating sequence. Others have also proposed that eBay should allow only the buyer to rate the seller (Chwelos and Dhar 2006) or that eBay should simultaneously reveal both partners' ratings (Reichling 2004 ).
In an attempt to address the problems inherent in the design of its reputation mechanism, eBay announced dramatic changes to its reputation mechanism in January of 2008. These changes, detailed in next section, are regarded the first major overhaul of its reputation mechanism since its inception. This change substantially transformed eBay's old two-way reputation mechanism into a new oneway mechanism. A one-way reputation mechanism might be preferable to a two-way mechanism for two major reasons. First, the one-way mechanism avoids problems of reciprocation and retaliation and therefore elicits more truthful feedbacks from both sellers and buyers. Chwelos and Dhar (2006) found that, in general, feedbacks from Amazon's one-way mechanism (only buyers can rate sellers) are more helpful than those from eBay's old two-way mechanism. Second, one-way feedback mechanisms are generally superior when reputation is more relevant for the supply side. Although eBay is a third-party market maker, the final price of the products auctioned in eBay is likely to be much more dependent on the sellers' reputation than the buyers' (Dellarocas et al. 2006) . Despite these advantages, the choice of one-way mechanisms over two-way mechanisms comes at two potential costs. First, buyers' performance is undervalued; there is no opportunity to -discipline‖ them with feedback (Dini and Spagnolo 2005) .
Changes in eBay's Reputation Mechanism
Second, participation in feedback provision may be reduced because there is no expectation of reciprocation. Clearly, the design of reputation mechanisms (two-way vs. one-way) depends on the tradeoff between eliciting more feedbacks and eliciting more truthful feedbacks. A brand-new marketplace might benefit more from a two-way than from a one-way mechanism in the sense that positive reciprocation induces perception of kindness between trading partners and increases the user base. In contrast, when there is already a critical mass of users, a one-way mechanism might be advantageous over a two-way mechanism in order to reduce reporting bias and ensure the prosperity of the market (Paolucci et al. 2009 ).
The above theoretical and practical reasons may help explain why eBay made the decision to reform its reputation mechanism. However, the change also led to several claims that the new mechanism was unfair to sellers, leaving them vulnerable to negligent bidders and scammers. ). It was reported that eBay's number of listings decreased by more than 13% in that week due to the strike (Swartz 2008) .
Undoubtedly, the introduction of changes to eBay's reputation mechanism and the online strike by infuriated sellers were two significant events. The change in eBay's reputation mechanism serves as an exogenous event that allows us to investigate how sellers respond to the different reputation mechanisms.
We identify three types of sellers: sellers who reacted strongly to the change in the reputation mechanism and actually joined the strike for the week of February 18 th to February 25 th (we refer to them as -strikers‖), sellers who participated in the online forum but chose not to participate in the strike (-forum sellers‖), and general sellers who did not participate in the forum or the strike (-general sellers‖). By looking for significant differences in reputation as well as gaming behavior among the three groups of sellers under the two reputation regimes, we are able to provide empirical evidence on how sellers respond to the two different reputation mechanisms.
More importantly, assessment of the sellers' responses allows us to empirically test the nature of eBay seller behavior. A critical question posed in theoretical work on reputation mechanisms is whether the nature of seller behavior is an issue of moral hazard or one of adverse selection (Dellarocas 2005) .
From a pure moral hazard perspective, the assumption is that all sellers are inherently good. They are able to behave honestly but may choose not to out of self-interest. Conversely, from a pure adverse selection perspective, sellers' types are fixed: either good or bad. Good sellers always exhibit good behaviors while bad sellers are always opportunistic. If the moral hazard assumption prevails, reputation mechanisms should focus on inducing honest and cooperative behaviors. On the other hand, if adverse selection prevails, reputation mechanisms should be designed to help potential buyers distinguish high quality sellers from low quality sellers with the goal of eliminating low quality sellers from the marketplace.
Empirically, it has been hard to test which of these assumptions -moral hazard versus adverse selectionis closer to the reality (i.e., whether seller behavior is intrinsically determined or not). In this study, we are able to shed some light on this important question by exploiting the exogenous changes in eBay reputation mechanism.
Data
As explained earlier, one key feature of our data relates to the policy change in eBay's reputation mechanism. eBay announced its re-design of the system in January 2008 As noted earlier, in our analysis, we focus on three groups of sellers who were sorted naturally by the online strike: strikers, general sellers, and forum sellers. The striker list was extracted from eBay's seller central forum. Strikers expressed their frustration with the proposed changes, signed up with their the changes to the reputation mechanism, our empirical analysis controls for changes to the fee structure.
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eBay IDs, and pledged to join the one-week strike. From this thread, we identified 398 unique strikers 3 .
For the control group, we drew a random sample of 2890 sellers from the eBay marketplace. To control for product categories, the sampling was stratified based on the product category distribution of the strikers.
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Since the strike was initiated in the eBay forum, one may argue that sellers active in the forum were more likely to strike merely because they knew about it. To control for this potential confound and ensure the robustness of our results, we introduced a second control group-forum sellers who were active in the forum but who did not participate in the strike. We also created a stratified random sample of 2280 forum sellers. Table 1 presents the definition of three groups of sellers. We collected two sets of data -sellers' feedback history and sellers' listing history data -for all three groups of sellers.
Does Revoking Hurt the Effectiveness of eBay's Reputation Mechanism?
It seems clear from the comments by strikers in the eBay forum that strikers really cared about equity in providing feedbacks and about the ability to revoke negative feedbacks. In our empirical investigation, we first compare the reputation profile for the three categories of sellers. We focus on seller feedbacks received in these two periods. Consistent with eBay's way of calculating reputations, we only considered unique feedbacks: multiple positive feedbacks from the same buyer were counted as only 1 positive feedback. We counted similarly for other types of feedbacks. Reputation score was defined as the number of unique positive feedbacks subtracted by the number of unique negative feedbacks.
On eBay, a seller's displayed reputation is reflected by his/her reputation score and percentage of positive feedbacks. The displayed percentage of positive feedbacks for a given seller is calculated by dividing the number of unique positive ratings by the total number of uniqiue positive ratings and unique negative ratings. We also considered other types of feedbacks such as neutral feedbacks and revoked feedbacks and calculated their respective percentages, which we call -true reputation‖ for a seller. We compared both displayed reputation and true reputation profile for the three categories of sellers as shown in Table 2 . Strikers were found to have a significantly lower reputation score than general sellers. The difference between strikers and forum sellers in terms of reputation score was not statistically significant.
If we, similarly, take into account only the positive and negative feedbacks, the average percentage of positive feedbacks for strikers, general sellers, and forum sellers was 99.79, 99.70, and 99.77 respectively.
Merely looking at positive feedbacks and negative feedbacks makes it impossible to differentiate between strikers and other two types of sellers.
However, a close inspection of all types of feedbacks revealed that strikers had a much higher revoked feedback percentage than both general sellers and forum sellers. The revoked feedbacks were originally negative feedbacks that had been withdrawn when both sellers and buyers mutually agree to do so. Adding in the original negative value of revoked feedbacks, we found that strikers actually had significantly more negative feedbacks (0.21%+0.49%=0.70%) than both general sellers (0.30%+0.12%=0.42%, t-value=4.25) and forum sellers (0.22%+0.11%=0.33%, t-value=6.59). This confirms that strikers have indeed strategically negotiated with buyers to revoke negative feedbacks so that they do not stand out from the others.
The above analysis provides evidence of strikers' revoking behavior. However, one could argue that it was bad buyers, not sellers, who retaliated; perhaps, the strikers simply faced bad buyers. We were able to distinguish who was retaliating by examining the order of feedbacks from the seller and the buyer in the transaction. We split revoked feedbacks into three categories: seller retaliated and revoked (SRR), buyer retaliated and revoked (BRR), and non-retaliation and revoked (NRR). SRR feedbacks refer to the 14 situation wherein the buyer leaves the seller a negative feedback followed by the seller retaliating with a negative feedback, and then both parties mutually agree to revoke the negative feedbacks. BRR feedbacks refer to the situation wherein the seller leaves the buyer a negative feedback followed by the buyer retaliating with a negative feedback, and then both parties mutually withdraw negative feedbacks. NRR feedbacks refer to the situation wherein the buyer gives the seller a negative feedback and the seller directly asks for a withdrawal without any retaliation. We examined the communications between buyers and sellers through text comments and found that, for NRR feedbacks, the seller typically does not retaliate because he committed a genuine error was and attempting to fix it (examples of replies include -Would be happy to give a full refund‖ and -Sorry for the confusion, we guarantee quality and delivery, will get enough back!‖). = 0.065%). This result is quite consistent with eBay's observation that -sellers leave retaliatory feedback eight times more frequently than buyers do‖. To summarize the findings so far, the main difference between strikers and the two other categories of sellers is the frequency of SRR feedbacks. This indicates that strikers have engaged in significantly more retaliation and revoking: they strategically retaliated against buyers by providing them negative feedbacks after receiving negative feedbacks and then negotiated with buyers to mutually revoke negative feedbacks.
accurately. While sellers and buyers can mutually agree to withdraw their feedbacks, some feedbacks are also withdrawn by eBay. A negative feedback is usually withdrawn by eBay if the buyer fails to respond to an -unpaid item notification‖. These negative feedbacks are generated when bad buyers who do not pay try to blame the sellers. We find that the three categories of sellers do not differ in frequency of eBaywithdrawn feedbacks, indicating that all sellers have a similar probability of facing such bad buyers. This provides further evidence that the differences in seller feedbacks in our sample are primarily due to different seller behaviors rather than differences in their probability of encountering bad buyers.
On eBay, an individual might be both a seller and a buyer. The individual may sell a few times but participate a lot more as a buyer. As a frequent buyer and only occasional seller, he might not care much about strategic revoking. Again, to check robustness, we separate feedbacks that an individual received as a seller and feedbacks the same individual received as a buyer. We then compare only feedbacks received as a seller for the three categories of sellers (see Table 4 and Table 5 ). All major results still hold. Overall, our findings consistently indicate that revoking can help hide a seller's bad behavior, making the reputation mechanism less effective in helping discern the quality of sellers.
In the next two sections, we describe our analysis of sellers' reactions to the changes in the reputation mechanism in two periods: shortly after the announcement and two months after the new system took effect (the post-change period).
Can Revoking Behavior Explain the Strike?
The occurrence of the strike seems to suggest that sellers cared about changes to eBay's reputation mechanism. However, eBay announced changes to its fee structure at the same time: lower listings fees (the price charged for each item listed to be sold on eBay) and higher final value fees (a percentage of the closing price extracted by eBay). Based on their listing and sales patterns, some eBay sellers believed that 16 they would have to pay more because of these changes. Thus, potential financial loss under the new fee structure could have also led some sellers to join the strike.
To control for the potential impact of changes in the fee structure, we collected detailed listings of sellers in all three groups one month prior to the strike (from January 18 We collected detailed information about each listing, including product category, auction style, start price, final price, and usage of features such as gallery pictures and subtitles. This allowed us to calculate the exact fee charged by eBay. We then aggregated the differences to the seller level. To measure potential financial loss, we calculated, for each listing, the difference between fees actually charged by eBay under the old fee structure and fees that would be charged by eBay under the new fee structure. Interestingly, all three types of sellers would benefit (i.e. save money) under the new fee policy. On average, over the one month of listings, strikers would save $8.04, general sellers would save $24.87, and forum sellers would save $19.29. The benefit to strikers is a bit lower than for the other two groups of sellers. Therefore, it is possible that the change in the fee structure contributed to participation in the strike, and this possibility needs to be controlled for.
In addition to changes to the fee structure, several other factors could potentially influence participation in the strike as well. Sellers with a larger number of listings would suffer more financially if they joined the strike and hence may have been less likely to participate. Powersellers 5 would also be less likely to join the strike because they would enjoy significant final value fee discounts under the new fee structure. The longer a seller has used eBay, the higher his/her switching cost due to a well-established and loyal customer base on eBay. These sellers should care more about the long-term interest and thus have a stronger reaction to the reduction of seller power under the new reputation mechanism. Therefore we included number of months on eBay as another control variable. Seller reputation is measured by both reputation score and eBay-displayed negative feedback percentage. The full specification of the model is: The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables in the regression are provided in Tables 7 and 8 . The maximum VIF is 2.04, well below the threshold of 10, indicating that there is no multicollinearity among the independent variables.
The results of the logit regression model are shown in Table 9 . Model 1 is the baseline model.
The coefficient of fee difference is significantly positive, suggesting that sellers who stand to lose more (or save less) under the new fee structure are more likely to strike. Consistent with our prediction, sellers with a longer tenure on eBay are more likely to strike. The coefficients of reputation score and displayed negative feedback percentage are not statistically significant. These two reputation measures do not explain a seller's propensity to strike. Powerseller status and the volume of listings do not have a significant effect on a seller's propensity to strike. In Model 2, we included the revoked feedback percentage in the regression. We find that the pseudo R 2 increases by almost 400%, supporting the assertion that a seller's revoking behavior has significant explanatory power on their participation in the strike. The coefficient of the percentage of revoked feedbacks is positive and is significant at the p<0.001 level, suggesting that sellers with a history of strategically revoking negative feedbacks were more likely to strike. In Model 3, we split revoked feedbacks into SRR feedbacks, BRR feedbacks, and NRR feedbacks. The Pseudo R 2 further increases by about 69%. The coefficient of SRR feedback percentage is significant and positive, but the coefficients of BRR feedback percentage and NRR feedback percentage are insignificant. This indicates that it is indeed the sellers who strategically retaliate and then revoke negative feedbacks that are more likely to strike. A 0.1% increase in SRR feedback percentage would lead to 17.60% increase in the odds of joining the strike. The coefficient of displayed negative feedback 18 percentage is negative and significant in Model 2 and Model 3, seemingly suggesting that good sellers with fewer negative feedbacks are more likely to strike. This seemingly surprising result can be explained by the fact that strikers' retaliation and revoking behavior significantly reduce their displayed negative feedbacks to be less than other sellers.
To summarize, the reputation profile comparison in the pre-change period and logit regression analyses provide empirical evidence that some sellers strategically retaliate against buyers to nullify their negative feedbacks, and it is these sellers who respond strongly to the policy change in the reputation mechanism. We next examine if these sellers were -bad sellers‖ (a case of adverse selection) or -ugly sellers‖ (a case of moral hazard) by examining their behavior and reputation scores in the post-change period. Table 2 , we find that the displayed negative feedback percentage increases for all three types of sellers (0.18% to 0.73% for strikers, 0.33% to 0.81% for general sellers, and 0.27% to 0.70% for forum sellers). This is consistent with our prediction: since sellers are no longer able to prevent buyers from leaving negative feedbacks by retaliating or to eliminate negative feedbacks by revoking, they are expected to have more negative feedbacks displayed in their profiles under the new reputation mechanism.
Changes in Seller Behavior
Taking into account feedback hidden by revoking, under the old reputation mechanism, strikers actually had a higher negative feedback percentage than general sellers and forum sellers. Under the pure adverse selection scenario, strikers who are -bad sellers‖ will continue to behave poorly and, on losing their -protection‖, will reveal themselves with their higher negative feedback percentage. Alternatively, if bad behavior was the result of moral hazard, then, after revoking is banned, these sellers will improve their quality and behave more honestly. It can be seen from Table 10 that strikers behaved similarly to general sellers and forum sellers in the post-change period. This indicates that strikers have improved their quality so much to be similar to general sellers and forum sellers under the new reputation mechanism. We also did a difference-in-difference comparison for the three groups of sellers with seller fixed effects. The average increase in actual negative feedback percentage for strikers is only 0.01%, significantly lower than the increase for general sellers (0.38%) and forum sellers (0.36%). As shown earlier, the difference in revoked negative feedbacks between strikers and non-strikers (i.e. general sellers and forum sellers) is attributed to SRR feedbacks but not NRR or BRR feedbacks. If we disregard NRR and BRR feedbacks and consider revoked negative feedbacks in the pre-change period only SRR feedbacks, the increase of negative feedbacks for strikers is about 0.06%, still significantly lower than the increase for general sellers (0.44%) and forum sellers (0.41%) at 90% significance level (t-value=-1.85).
Overall, this provides support for the moral hazard assumption about seller behavior. Misbehaving sellers (i.e. the strikers in our sample) are the -ugly sellers‖ -inherently good sellers who strategically choose to behave dishonestly. Under the new reputation mechanism that does not allow strategic retaliation or revoking, they behave honestly and improve their service quality, leading to a lower increase in negative feedback percentage.
By comparing sellers' sell-through rates, we find additional evidence that revokers improved their service. Sell-through rate is defined as the percentage of successfully sold listings. based on the sample of 290 strikers, 1986 general sellers, and 1677 forum sellers. There was no difference in the sell-through rate between strikers and non-strikers. Under the old reputation mechanism, through strategic retaliation and revoking, strikers masqueraded as similar to non-strikers in displayed reputation profile, which resulted in similar sell-through rates. Under the new reputation mechanism wherein strategic retaliation and revoking became impossible, strikers continued to have the same sell-through rate as general sellers and forum sellers. This indicates that strikers improved their service to offset the 20 potential increase in negative feedbacks stemming from the loss of -protection‖ from strategic retaliation and revoking. Thus, the moral hazard assumption of seller behavior is further supported.
One potential alternative explanation for strikers' improved feedback compared with non-strikers is that strikers simply switched to safer product categories instead of improving their service. We compare the change in percentages of listings in all product categories for strikers and non-strikers. Table   12 presents the result for the top 5 product categories. There is no significant difference between strikers and non-strikers. This result also holds for the rest of the 26 product categories 6 . Thus, there is no significant difference between strikers and non-strikers in terms of product category change.
Researchers have argued that different products categories might inherently have different potential for receiving negative feedbacks. For example, MacInnes et al. (2005) found that in eBay online auctions, transactions in services are more likely to result in disputes than transactions in physical goods. Scott and Gregg (2004) proposed that, when purchased online, high sensory products such as clothing and furniture are more likely to generate negative feedbacks compared with low sensory products. Product categories may differ in their inherent riskiness and, consequently, in the number of complaints received by their sellers (MacInnes et al. 2005 ). This product category risk is aligned with the consumers' beliefs regarding whether the products will perform according to their expectations (Bhatnagar et al. 2000) .
Product category risk increases with greater technical complexity, price, and needs of feel and touch (Bhatnagar et al. 2000 , Chang et al. 2006 Finch 2007) . We examine whether strikers moved to low-risk product categories more than general sellers and forum sellers after the change in the reputation mechanism. We consider only the top 5 product categories: clothing, collectibles, books, jewelry, and electronics. These top 5 categories account for more than half of all listings. Clothing is considered a high-risk product category because of the sensory nature of the product and the difficulty in describing its features accurately (Bhatnagar et al. 2000) . Collectibles are considered a high-risk product category because they have many attributes and a complex description is required (Scott and Gregg 2004) . Books, which are typically lower priced items, are considered to be a low-risk product category. Jewelry is considered a high-risk product category as sellers who cheat stand to benefit more from higher price items.
Electronics are considered to be a high-risk product category because, in general, electronic items are technically and descriptively complex. According to Bhatnagar et al. (2000) 's rank of product category risk, electronics are much riskier than clothing and books. Table 13 presents the percentage of listings in high-risk and low-risk product categories for strikers and non-strikers. Before the change in reputation mechanism, strikers are not statistically different from non-strikers in high-risk or low-risk product selling. After the change in the reputation mechanism, strikers' sales in high-risk and low-risk product categories are still roughly the same as non-strikers.
Indeed, if we compare the change in percentage of listings in high-risk and low-risk product categories, there are no significant differences between strikers and non-strikers. These findings suggest that, compared with non-strikers, strikers do not shift more from high-risk product categories to low-risk product categories in order to reduce potential disputes from buyers. Therefore, the observed improvement in feedbacks for strikers is primarily caused by their improving service behavior rather than by a shift in the category of product that they sell.
Robustness Check
Strikers are those sellers who responded strongly to the reputation change. One might argue that they are not representative of all sellers on eBay who use retaliation and revoking to strategically improve their reputation scores. To examine this, we redefine revokers and non-revokers based on their retaliatory and revoking behavior in the -general sellers‖ group. -Revokers‖ are defined as sellers who engaged in strategic retaliation and revoking behavior. -Non-revokers‖ are sellers who never strategically retaliated and never revoked any negative feedbacks. This resulted in 221 revokers and 2669 non-revokers.
22 Table 14 presents the reputation profile comparison between revokers and non-revokers for the pre-change period. If we consider only the displayed positive and negative feedback distributions, revokers and non-revokers do not differ. However, in reality, revokers had a much higher initially negative feedback percentage than non-revokers (0.91%+0.46%=1.37% for revokers, and 0.05%+0.29%=0.34% for non-revokers, t-value=13.18). This further indicates that the revoking mechanism dilutes the effectiveness of reputation mechanism in helping to differentiate sellers. Table 15 presents the distribution of the three categories of revoked feedbacks for revokers and non-revokers.
Revokers and non-revokers are not different in percentage of BRR feedbacks and NRR feedbacks. This indicates that whereas revokers engaged in significantly more retaliation and revoking behavior than nonrevokers, they did not face more bad buyers who strategically revoke or participate more in good intention revoking by correcting honest mistakes. Table 16 presents the reputation profile comparison between revokers and non-revokers for the post-change period. Revokers had a significantly higher negative feedback percentage than non-revokers.
However, the 0.05% increase in actual negative feedback percentage for revokers is lower than the 0.41% increase for non-revokers at 90% significance level (t-value=-1.72). If we calculate revoked negative feedbacks in the pre-change period by only SRR feedbacks, the increase in actual negative feedbacks is about 0.13% for revokers, significantly lower than the 0.46% increase for non-revokers. Overall, this
indicates that revokers changed their behavior in a positive way to mitigate the increase in negative feedbacks caused by the change in the reputation mechanism. Again, this supports the moral hazard assumption of seller behavior.
We compared sell-through rates and selling behavior for the 151 revokers and 1835 non-revokers Table 17 , revokers and non-revokers have similar sell-through rates in both the pre-change and post-change periods. This result is consistent with the comparison between strikers and non-strikers, providing further support for the moral hazard assumption about seller behavior. As shown in Table 18 , revokers and non-revokers did not differ from each other in the change in percentage of listings in the top 5 product categories (and the remaining 26 product categories 7 ). Compared with nonrevokers, revokers sold less in low-risk product categories but not in high-risk product categories as shown in Table 19 . This might be one reason why revokers initially received more negative feedbacks than non-revokers. This difference between revokers and non-revokers still hold after the change in the reputation mechanism took effect. The magnitudes of change in percentage of listings in low-risk product categories and high-risk product categories for revokers and non-revokers are not significantly different.
These findings suggest that the observed lower increase of negative feedbacks for revokers is not caused by shifting to low-risk product categories, but is instead largely due to their quality improvement in selling.
Because SRR feedbacks are quite rare, observing a significantly higher percentage of SRR feedbacks for revokers requires that they have a significantly higher number of feedbacks than nonrevokers. Therefore, it is not surprising that the average reputation score for non-revokers (156.66) is much lower than the average reputation score for revokers (815.25) . This result is also consistent with Wood et al. (2002) 's finding that sellers with high reputation scores are more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior because buyers have high tolerance for them. As a robustness check, we used propensity score matching methods to correct for potential sample selection bias due to the observable difference (Dehejia and Wahba 2002) . We first predicted propensity score based on a logit regression of treatment (i.e., the status of revoker) on reputation score. Then, for each revoker in the treatment group, we identified one match in the control group (i.e., non-revokers) using nearest neighbor matching on the propensity score. Common support condition was imposed so that treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the controls were dropped. This resulted in 213 revokers and 213 non-revokers. The average reputation score is -revokers, t-value=1.37 ). This suggests that the revoking mechanism dampens the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism in signaling the quality of sellers. The increase in actual negative feedback percentage for revokers is significantly lower than the increase for non-revokers (0.02% for revokers and 0.92% for non-revokers, t-value=2.76), suggesting once again that the moral hazard assumption of seller behavior prevails on eBay.
We perform an additional robustness check by varying the definition criteria for revokers. For example, we define revokers as sellers who have at least 3 negative feedbacks and strategically retaliated and revoked at least 1 of them. Similar results were obtained and the moral hazard assumption is supported.
Discussions and Implications
Reputation mechanisms are vital to the success of online marketplaces such as eBay. Taking advantage of the exogenous change in eBay's reputation mechanism and the resulting online strike, we examine, for the first time, sellers' strategic gaming behavior related to revoking negative feedbacks. We find evidence that certain sellers strategically utilize revoking to -improve‖ their reputation. Compared with general sellers, strikers have a much higher revoked feedback percentage. The changes to the reputation mechanism instituted by eBay have a significant influence on the behavior of these sellers. They exert more effort in their transactions to bring their quality up to par with other sellers. Our findings also shed light on fundamental assumptions of seller behavior. Our results indicate that seller behavior is more the result of moral hazard than a case of adverse selection. This has important implications for the design of online reputation mechanisms.
The current findings make significant contributions to the literature on online reputation mechanism design (for example, see Dellarocus 2005; Fan et al. 2005; Qu et al. 2008; Zhou et al.2008) . A reputation mechanism should facilitate market transactions by separating good players (either sellers or buyers) from bad ones and inducing honest behavior. We provide the first empirical evidence that sellers do respond to the design of the reputation mechanism. Allowing revoking of feedbacks facilitates sellers' strategic gaming behavior. After revoking is disabled, the more opportunistic sellers -behave better‖. The above findings also provide empirical evidence for a fundamental assumption in the theoretical modeling of reputation mechanisms: whether sellers should be modeled as intrinsically good or bad.
This paper is part of the growing literature on gaming behavior in online marketplace. Kauffman and Wood (2005) examined the shilling behavior of sellers to artificially raise bidding prices. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) find that roughly one-third of sellers built their reputations by acting as a buyer first. Jin and Kato (2006) found that some eBay sellers make non-credible claims of quality and mislead buyers.
We contribute to the above literature by introducing a new way of studying seller's strategic behavior.
Our work is also related to the question of how consumers should interpret sellers' reputation. Zhang (2006) finds that reputation as seller and as a buyer has different impacts on closing price. Our findings show that reputation system should make consumers aware of seller strategic behavior to better differentiate their quality.
Managerially, this study has two implications. First, the finding that revoking elicits strategic behavior in sellers suggests that, when revoking is available to sellers, online market makers should adopt other measures to reveal more quality information to buyers. One potential way to do this is to take into account revoked feedbacks when calculating overall reputation and to display the percentage of revoked feedbacks to buyers. Currently there is no easy and straightforward way of getting this information from eBay or other similar markets. Second, the finding that bad seller behavior is due to moral hazard rather than adverse selection suggests that online market makers should focus on soliciting truthful behavior through the design of their reputation mechanisms rather than driving out bad sellers.
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This study has two limitations. First, we restricted our investigation to sellers with lifetime total feedbacks of 500 to ensure that we examine active sellers with substantial number of transactions, who account for the majority of the transactions on eBay. Second, eBay made some other changes in October of 2008 (e.g. no checks or money order as payment methods) that, although not related to the reputation mechanism, could have influenced selling behavior. We believe the confounding effects of these other changes, should be small or nonexistent, as most eBay sellers were primarily concerned with the change in fee structure and the change in feedback mechanism.
The study can be extended in a number of interesting ways. It would be interesting to conduct a more detailed analysis of how the process of revoking unfolds by looking at both sellers' and buyers' detailed feedback behavior. It is also important to understand how the changes in reputation mechanism influence market efficiency. A detailed comparison of final auction prices between strikers and general sellers may shed light on this. Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether banning revoking in the new system benefits eBay or not. It is possible that the changes will induce buyers to behave opportunistically. Further, the increase in negative ratings from buyers could damage the perception that eBay is a safe place for transactions. Further research is needed on the costs and benefits of a one-way reputation mechanism versus a two-way reputation mechanism. Numbers for forum sellers in parenthesis, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 Numbers for forum sellers in parenthesis, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
